

OKIMS

iden3

iden3.io  
@identthree

Scalable distributed identity system on ZKP

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## About iden3 project

- Beyond circom and snarkjs
- Protocols, data structures and modules
- Open Source with reference implementation



# iden3 current objectives

- **Self-sovereign** Ethereum-based identities for all at **no cost**
- **Scalability** by off-chain model which minimizes on-chain transactions
- **Privacy by design** with zero knowledge and non-reusable proofs
- Complete solution with user **wallet**, libraries and **key management**
- Focus on **community standardization** and foundation for use cases




## Identities wallet

- A new implementation of the web-based wallet:

wallet.iden3.io

- Recovery by export/import of the complete wallet



## Design principles

- Design for Trust
- Design for Understanding
- Design for Data Ownership and Control
- Design for Usefulness



# Design process

Research


Flows mapping

Usability testing

Release

- **User Research:** Understand user needs, security and privacy issues.
- **User Flows Mapping:** Prototype user interface for real-life scenarios.
- **Usability Testing and Iteration:** Validate design concepts and test the end-to-end service.
- **iden3 Identity Wallet Release:** Ongoing performance monitoring and improvement lifecycle.

# Future wallet




# Single sign-on for Apps

Complete identity provider scenario for classical centralized apps (Alpha)

All libraries and process of installation at:

<https://github.com/iden3/centralized-login-demo>




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# Privacy: Zero-knowledge proofs


You can prove something **without revealing** unnecessary information:

- Prove you paid your taxes
- Entrance to a nightclub proving that you are 18+
- Anonymous voting
- Participate in an ICO anonymously but with the warranty that a 3rd party KYC'd you





## Identity genesis

- Identity protocol
- Location of the official claim merkle root for this identity
- Recovery Mechanism
- Revocation key/s
- Initial operational keys
- Other metadata...




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# Direct Claims



- Claims are stored in a Merkle tree and the merkle root stored on chain.
- The history is **kept on chain**.
- A prolific claim generator can add/modify **millions of claims** on a single transaction.

# Indirect claims



- An identity **signs** the claim tree root and **sends** it off chain to the relayer.
- With relayers, millions of users can create millions of claims on mainnet **without** spending any **gas**.

# Identity Discovery Protocol



searcher




p2p network



Identity relay

# Identity based services

- Email
- Messaging
- Home page (Like linkedin)
- Public claims
- Social applications
- ...



# Basic operations of an identity



Sign



Make a Claim

# Form request / Filling protocol

- Data (Example: Name, address, email, phone, picture, etc).
- Signature
- Cryptographic proofs

The image shows a contact form with the following fields and labels:

- Name**: Add your name
- Email**: Enter a Valid Email
- Phone**: Add a Phone Number
- Website**: Your Website
- Priority**: Low (Priority Level)
- Type**: Website Update (Type of Contact)
- Message**: Type Your Message

A **Submit** button is located at the bottom right of the form.



## Identity naming (aliases)

- Binding names to identities with iden3 name resolver module (i.e.):

[jordi@iden3.io](mailto:jordi@iden3.io) -> 0xC23a677...

- Notifications module to receive at wallet on protocol or workflow steps



# Circom - Circomlib - SnarkJS

**Circom:** DSL Language to generate ZK circuits

**Circomlib:** Standard components for Circom language

- BabyJub EDDSA
- Pedersen/MiMC Hashes
- Sparse Merkle trees
- ...

**Snarkjs:** Independent zkSnarks implementation in javascript

- Browser ready

# Anonymous Logins

- Any employee can login to a platform without revealing which employee you are.
- Only a user is allowed per employee. (Nullifier)




# Reputation proof

- An identity can prove a given reputation calculated with a given algorithm, but does not need to reveal the sources.




Reputation  
score= 25




# Cross identity proof

- You can prove that you hold other identities with some claims (reputation).



# Privacy: Non-reusable proofs



- A received proof is **not valid** to send to a **third** identity.
- To prove A, you create a new proof A' that is valid either if A is valid OR you know the private key of the recipient.

## Thank you

- zkSNARKs: optimization work in progress
- New protocols for a complete solution
- Contributing to standardization of self-sovereign identity
- Working to enable universal login
- Wallet redesign for user adoption

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# Zero Knowledge Technologies State of the Art

Scheme	Runtime		Size		PQ?	Universal?	Untrusted setup?	Assumptions
	Prover	Verifier	CRS	Proof				
Hyrax	$d(hc + c \log c) + w$	$\ell + d(h + \log(hc))$	$\sqrt{w}$	$d \log(hc) + \sqrt{w}$	○	●	●	DL
ZK vSQL	$n \log(c)$	$\ell + d \text{ polylog}(n)$	$\log(n)$	$d \log(c)$	○	●	◐	$q$ -type, KOE
Ligero	$n \log(n)$	$c \log(c) + h \log(h)$	0	$\sqrt{n}$	◐	●	●	CRHF
Bootle et al. [22]	$n$	$n$	0	$\sqrt{n}$	◐	●	●	CRHF
Baum et al. [4]	$n \log(n)$	$n$	$\sqrt{n}$	$\sqrt{n \log(n)}$	◐	●	●	SIS
STARKs	$n \text{ polylog}(n)$	$\text{polylog}(n)$	0	$\log^2(n)$	◐	●	●	CRHF
Aurora	$n \log(n)$	$n$	0	$n$	◐	●	●	CRHF
Bulletproofs	$n \log(n)$	$n \log(n)$	$n$	$\log(n)$	○	●	●	DL
SNARKs	$n \log(n)$	$\ell$	$n$	1	○	○	○	$q$ -type, KOE
Groth et al. [44]	$n \log(n)$	$\ell$	$n^2$	1	○	●	◐	$q$ -type, KOE
Sonic	$n \log(n)$	$\ell$	$n$	1	○	●	◐	AGM

**Table 1: Asymptotic efficiency comparison of zero-knowledge proofs for arithmetic circuits.** Here  $n$  is the number gates,  $d$  is the depth of the circuit,  $h$  is the width of the subcircuits,  $c$  is the number of copies of the subcircuits,  $\ell$  is the size of the instance, and  $w$  is the size of the witness. An empty circle denotes that the scheme does not have this property and a full circle denotes that the scheme does have this property. A half circle for post-quantum security denotes that it is feasibly post-quantum secure but that there is no proof. A half circle for untrusted setup denotes that the scheme is updatable. DL stands for discrete log, CRHF stands for collision-resistant hash functions, KOE stands for knowledge-of-exponent, and AGM stands for algebraic group model.